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and (v) respond to social values and the needs of the public. As a result, the agency has gained broad support from professional groups, patient groups and the general public.
Today, the functions of NICE include:
1. The production and dissemination of guidance for individual technologies, clinical guidelines, public health, and social care.
2. The development of performance standards and metrics for overseeing the implementation of these guidelines.
3. The provision of general information to health professionals and patient groups to empower them to make their own healthcare decisions.
The NICE decision process shown in Figure 2 PHARMAC's decision to fund a treatment (i.e., to list it on the Pharmaceutical Schedule) follows these steps:
Step 1: Receipt of proposals from the public, which can include anyone from health professionals to pharmaceutical companies to patient groups
Step 2 Step 3: Economic assessment -assesses the relative value of the drug
Step 4: Prioritization for funding
Step 5: Negotiation
Step 6: Consultation
Step 7: Decision
Step 8: Implementation
The process is often nonlinear. For example, if prioritization for funding is low due to cost (step 4), but negotiation reduces the price significantly (step 5), PHARMAC goes back to step 3 and its economic assessment improves. This change moves the treatment to a higher priority (step 4), thereby enabling the drug to continue through to consultation (step 6) and ultimately implementation (step 8). Economic assessment (step 3), decision-making (step 7), and pricing strategies are explained in greater detail below.
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT AT PHARMAC (STEP 3) to take any such "other criteria" into account.
Despite early criticism about redundancies, PHARMAC has successfully 17 operated with these criteria by applying them in a pragmatic and transparent manner.
A key differentiator between these criteria and those of NICE is how these criteria expand beyond costeffectiveness and explicitly take budgetary impact into account. While NICE will consider factors beyond cost effectiveness (efficiency) in its decision-making, PHARMAC's approach allows for more flexibility.
It is also important to highlight that in addition to these criteria used during the decision-making process, PHARMAC has an exceptional circumstances process that may provide funding on an individual patient basis.
Criteria for exceptional circumstances funding include: 17 Given the lack of an alternative pharmaceutical policy in New Zealand against which to compare PHARMAC, it is difficult to empirically and definitively assert "success." Nevertheless, the continued operation of PHARMAC for more than 20 years under successive governments with changing priorities, its continued expansion and remit, and successful defense of methods and process within the New Zealand judicial system indicates some level of success.
In determining whether a treatment is considered to fall under "exceptional circumstances," PHARMAC must first review how many patients have been affected. Some of those interventions would be classified as usual pharmaceuticals, while others would fall under "orphan drug" criteria. After this designation, PHARMAC makes a decision by relying on its nine decision criteria. In theory, the agency could assess and approve an orphan drug that was extremely cost-ineffective because of the unavailability of other drugs for that condition.
PRICING STRATEGIES
PHARMAC relies on the following strategies to reduce and manage drug prices: 18 Some of the key methodological experts who were involved in developing NICE HTA methods were also involved in the development of PHARMAC HTA methods.
19 As described earlier NICE's Appraisal Committees also take into account "considerations beyond efficiency" when making recommendations
Another important difference is related to the different parties conducting and managing the process, which has implications for independence and transparency.
PHARMAC conducts all HTA and negotiations inhouse, limiting the real-time involvement of patient representatives and other stakeholders in the process, except during the general consultation process.
NICE is highly transparent, providing comprehensive consultation and engaging in active public involvement.
In addition, the use of independent Appraisal
Committees made up of practicing health professionals, academics, technical specialists and patient representatives provides another layer of transparency and wider stakeholder involvement. The value of differing levels of transparency is beyond the scope of this policy brief, and it is highly likely that PHARMAC would not be able to achieve such significant price reductions for pharmaceuticals if it were as transparent as NICE. Tables 3 and 4 to conduct HTA, but decision-makers refer to this one entity for their information needs. Other countries stated that purchasers might also perform HTA, which could mean regions or provinces in decentralized countries, or individual health insurance funds.
Nevertheless, the fundamental concept that indirectly or directly influences many of the differences between PHARMAC and NICE is the explicit consideration of a set budget by PHARMAC and the estimate of opportunity cost used by NICE. The limitation for PHARMAC in using a predefined budget is that this budget relates only to community pharmaceuticals; therefore, the tradeoff will always be the health that could be achieved through the use of pharmaceuticals. Consequently, the concern is that if a pharmaceutical was available that offered substantially better health gain per dollar (i.e., was more technically efficient) than other means of generating health in the New Zealand health service, it might not be funded if its budgetary impact was too high, resulting in sub-optimal allocation of resources and lower overall health from the funding available.
In addition, it is also possible that a pharmaceutical might be approved for funding, but due to the limited budget, the funding would not start until the following financial year. The fairness and political tolerability of allowing budget cycles to dictate people's access to a pharmaceutical that could potentially make a substantial impact on length and quality of life need to be considered; however, one could argue that these are concerns in theory only, and that the nature of health policy decision-making, the ability to specify exceptions to the rule, and annual budget-setting means that the system could incrementally and pragmatically self-correct. In addition, the sub-optimality in applying a fixed budget may simply be a reflection of reality. By acknowledging that no decision-making process will ever be able to achieve perfect allocative efficiency, there is a strong argument that making the decisionmaker explicitly responsible to both the patient and the tax payer is the only way to achieve optimal allocation of health resources. 
